Introduction
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is synonymous with the US Military and its transformation following the end of the Cold War, which would see operational platforms networked, flexible and for use in joint operations. The role of technology in general and information and communication technology (ICT) in particular meant that the deployable platforms and possibly even networks would transform the way that the US went to war. This chapter looks at those who stand beside the US military most often in combat: the European allies. The focus here is on how RMA, as it was understood and conveyed in the US, shaped the thinking and doctrine of European militaries. In Europe, the term RMA and even the concept are seen as belonging to the US, grand power and an overwhelming reliance on technological superiority to achieve military victory. European militaries have focused more on the notion of transformation, innovation and modernization to mean how any such benefits of RMA could be adapted or utilized in European military operations and in connection to European military operations with the US where compatibility is an important command factor. If RMA points the way towards military victory on the battlefield, why then have Europeans not taken the opportunity to follow their North American ally?
European military modernization naturally varies from state to state. We can see, however, that modernization has been ordinarily slow, limited and contested in Europe. This is not to say that European militaries themselves do not like new systems, kit and weapons. Rather, the limitations of modernization can be seen as cultural, political and at times operational. This chapter argues that Europeans see RMA as an extension of the way that Americans progress and change rather than a distinct path to military victory. In as much as RMA should be internalized or even Europeanized, there is distinct resistance to the notion of using an American approach to war in Europe. Further, the changing relationship between European societies and their militaries changes the foundation on which capabilities, and with them budgets, are based. Finally, modernization challenges established institutions, actors and structures within European militaries. Change always comes at a cost to the established. As a result of these factors, as we shall see, there has been a limit to military modernization in Europe.
This chapter seeks to address the central question in three ways. The first section examines the nature of military modernization in Europe. If the Europeans have not done a RMA at home, how then have they changed? I look specifically how this is linked to RMA innovations in strategy and operations. Secondly, I look at ways to understand the US-European relationship around RMA, paying particular attention to learning and norm transfer. Finally, I look at how the Europeans have sought to understand RMA as an American form of modernization and in relation to their own militaries. I pay special attention to the way European defense decision-makers see the US and its war machine in relation to modernization. The chapter teases out the factors that limit military modernization in Europe.
European military modernization
During the Cold War, European militaries on both sides of the Iron Curtain maintained large, mass armies, navies and air wings to respond to what many thought would be yet another World War between the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union and its allies. Once the Cold War was over, there was a growing tendency to retreat , reduce and review . For many, but in particular the major powers, the change in geo-politics meant bringing forces home from international postings in Western Europe for the United States and from Central and Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union then Russian Federation. Many foreign military bases closed, for instance, in the newly unified Germany. There was a strategic assumption then that the distribution of force through mass armies was no longer necessary. Despite the challenges in the Former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, base troop numbers have remained relatively stable since the mid-1990s.
At the same time, there was a decision to do away with the mass militaries, especially armies, altogether.
1 This tactical thinking came in the
